Short summary:
- bugs.php.net: SQLi, XSS
- pecl.php.net: SQLi, XSS
- master.php.net: SQLi, XSS, possible server-side command execution
- gtk.php.net: SQLi, XSS, auth bypass
Reported: 03.05.2014
Fixed: 11.06.2014
Details:
bugs.php.net
-
SQL Injection in get_resolve_reasons() function from functions.php (project variable)
function get_resolve_reasons($project = false) { global $dbh; $where = ''; if ($project !== false) $where.= "WHERE (project = '{$project}' OR project = '')"; $resolves = $variations = array(); $res = $dbh->prepare("SELECT * FROM bugdb_resolves $where")->execute(array()); ...
-
2. XSS in bug.php ($_POST['in']['email'])
... <input type="text" size="40" maxlength="40" name="in[email]" value="<?php echo isset($_POST['in']) && isset($_POST['in']['email']) ? $_POST['in']['email'] : ''; ?>" /> ...
pecl.php.net
-
XSS in account-edit.php (handle parameter), because of bad regexp validation
... if ($handle && !preg_match('@[0-9A-Za-z_]{2,20}$@', $handle)) { response_header('Error:'); report_error("No valid handle given!"); response_footer(); exit(); } ...
Regular expression used in preg_match is checking only string ending, not the beggining. Possible example: account-edit.php?handle=<script>alert('XSS')</script>AAAA -
SQL injection in package-delete.php (id parameter)
... $query = "SELECT p.name, r.version FROM packages p, releases r WHERE p.id = r.package AND r.package = '" . $_GET['id'] . "'"; $row = $dbh->getAll($query); ...
- XSS in package-delete.php (id parameter)
- Some other minor issues I've noticed:
- Small typo (should be $_GET instead of $GET) in package-new.php:
... if(isset($_GET[$arg])) $_GET[$arg] = htmlspecialchars($GET[$arg], ENT_QUOTES); ...
-
User with password that match /^[a-z0-9]{32}$/ is unable to log in.
... function auth_verify($user, $passwd) ... // Check if the passwd is already md5()ed if (preg_match('/^[a-z0-9]{32}$/', $passwd)) { $crypted = $passwd; } else { $crypted = md5($passwd); } ...
- Small typo (should be $_GET instead of $GET) in package-new.php:
master.php.net
-
Possible serveside command execution in network/api.php
... $res = db_query("SELECT * FROM mirrors LEFT JOIN country ON mirrors.cc = country.id WHERE mirrors.hostname='".mysql_real_escape_string($_GET['host'])."' LIMIT 0,1"); $row = mysql_fetch_assoc($res); ... $cname = $row['cname']; $ip_info = str_replace(PHP_EOL,'; ',trim(`host $cname | grep -i address`)); $ping_stats = nl2br(trim(`ping -c1 -i1 -w1 $cname | grep -v PING | grep -v "ping statistics"`)); $ip_addr = gethostbyname($_GET['host']); ...
Although cname variable comes from database it's not properly sanitized by escapeshell* function(s). - Many SQL injections in forgot.php, entry/svn-account.php, manage/event.php, manage/mirrors.php. However they're not exploitable because of magic_quotes_gpc enabled in production environment (but in other places user input is sanitized anyway)
-
SQL injection in manage/user-notes.php (id parameter)
... $sql = 'DELETE FROM votes WHERE votes.note_id = ' . real_clean($id); ...
include/functions.inc:... function real_clean($var) { return mysql_real_escape_string($var); } ...
Neither magic_quotes_gpc nor real_clean() protect from specific injection (like: '1 or 1=1'). - XSS in manage/event.php (action parameter)
... $valid_vars = array('id', 'action','in','begin','max','search','order','full','unapproved'); foreach($valid_vars as $k) { $$k = isset($_REQUEST[$k]) ? $_REQUEST[$k] : false; } ... if ($id && $action) { switch ($action) { ... default: warn("that action ('$action') is not understood."); } } ...functions.inc:
... function format_warn($message) { return "$message
"; } function warn($message) { echo format_warn($message); } ...
gtk.php.net
Note: First of all the whole site in production environment seems to be deprecated and many things don't work.-
Authorization bypass:
In most places authorization is done by:... if ($user = get_user()) { ...
cvs-auth.inc:... function get_user() { if (isset($_COOKIE['PHP-GTK'])) { list($user, $pass) = explode(':', base64_decode($_COOKIE['PHP-GTK'])); $stored = file_get_contents(DB_DIR."/$user.txt"); if ($pass == $stored) { return $user; } } return false; } ...
Setting cookie to base64_encode("user_that_do_not_exists:") will bypass authorization because of used "==" operator ('' == false -> true). - Multiple SQL injections in manual/browse-notes.php, manual/browse.php
- XSS in manual/browse-notes.php, params: $_GET['let'] and $_GET['y']
- manual1/* and apps/* vulnerabilities but it seems they're broken/disabled in production environment (propably because of mysql_connect timeout)
Commits with fixes:
http://git.php.net/?p=web/bugs.git;a=commit;h=e353f1f83f51adb95a5fc981e0ee37d2374602d5
http://git.php.net/?p=web/bugs.git;a=commit;h=46a74d234c026fea0928764e940a729801d604b5
http://git.php.net/?p=web/gtk.git;a=commit;h=7a62171c7ed46085d3d1244abea28e7a3e65ad11
http://git.php.net/?p=web/gtk.git;a=commit;h=7230b03244974298af17507a36f34d10a9d777a0
http://git.php.net/?p=web/gtk.git;a=commit;h=723496f654da0b63c128d46a67c3952aed195a83
http://git.php.net/?p=web/pecl.git;a=commit;h=219bbdfce56c8cfca91189fa8a9bb2df6158d02c
http://git.php.net/?p=web/pecl.git;a=commit;h=0a30bab1c4763ebf5a36120afd4039b23da5a427
http://git.php.net/?p=web/pecl.git;a=commit;h=5251a3f8518a600a07d3ceacc2606c167dd0fba8
http://git.php.net/?p=web/pecl.git;a=commit;h=2a1f91d8016ddc4be5156743f49e922a2ab6a937
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=e024ef1a36b36785955816a1ee95c9c498ad0550
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=9404bdc83562397e78c35e6daf2c91bf8a886f60
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=efa8fa543bd8ebb808407be4f2dcc7c3204a615b
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=41e4d4aff29ccbf0ab3ac756e344d73ba1f4e0c2
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=1b0dac3d83739242e2cca66ea533bc03e5553ada
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=0ac39f3249b9c06cea6e50fa985f447cba92a309
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=e7dca7e9d57a29cf93c2a5673c0d8acd275e4c1e
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=b75fa9c0ebdcf7da01c2d68500c2de13a5ea2d83
http://git.php.net/?p=web/master.git;a=commit;h=f1ba778df22b8e54a3e71d728ad7cf06be3c502d
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